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SUBMERGED PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS:
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROPOSED
LAW OF THE SEA TREATY TEXT
William T. Burke*
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS)
convened in its fourth and fifth sessions for several months of negotia-
tions in 1976.1 At the fourth session in New York in the spring the
Conference discussed the Informal Single Negotiating Text (Informal
Text),2 developed at the third session in Geneva in 1975, in sufficient
detail to result in issuance of a Revised Single Negotiating Text (Re-
vised Text).3 The fifth session mef in New York in August-September,
but no revisions in the Revised Text were made4 and the question of
an ultimate treaty remains open. 5
* Professor of Law and Marine Studies, University of Washington. The author
has served as an expert on the United States delegation to the Law of the Sea Con-
ference. The views expressed herein are personal views only and do not necessarily
reflect the position of the United States or any other entity.
1. The Conference convened for its initial session in New York in December 1973
to decide on organizational and procedural matters. Three committees were established
to consider substantive matters. The Second Committee, which was entrusted with such
subjects as the territorial sea regime and international straits, has considered the tran-
sit passage issue. The Conference's first substantive session met in Caracas in June
1974. The summary records and documents are collected in Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (5 vol. to date, 1975-76) [hereinafter cited as
Third U.N. Conf.]. Prior to the Conference, the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee
had devoted three years (1971-73) to preparatory work including negotiating the
Conference's agenda. See Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-
Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National JArisdiction [hereinafter cited
as Report of Sea-Bed Committee], 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21), U.N. Doc.
A/9021 (1973); Report of Sea-Bed Committee, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21), U.N.
Doc. A/8721 (1972); Report of Sea-Bed Committee, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21),
U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971).
2. 4 Third U.N. Conf. 137-81, U.N. Doc. AICONF.62/WP.8 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Informal Text].
3. 5 Third U.N. Conf. 125-201, U.N. Doc. AICONF.621WP.8/Rev.1 & AICONF.62/
WP.9IREV.I (1976) [hereinafter cited as Revised Text]. The major provisions of the
Revised Text concerning transit passage are reproduced in Appendix I, with significant
changes in the Informal Text italicized. References herein to specific articles of the
Informal and Revised Texts are to Parts II thereof, which have been the responsibility
of the Second Committee. Such articles are referred to throughout this piece without
specific footnotes.
4. The principal products of the fifth session were committee reports issued at the
end of the session and a document concerning dispute settlement to be issued later.
The report most pertinent to this discussion is Report of Second Committee Chairman
on the Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. AICONF.62/t. 17 (Sept. 16, 1976).
5. The next Conference session is scheduled to begin in New York in May 1977,
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Among numerous important problems before the Conference, one
of the most critical is the right of transit passage through straits, those
narrow passageways which would fall within the territorial sea when
nations generally agree on a twelve-mile limit.6 The right of subma-
rines to pass submerged through straits (and of airplanes to overfly) is
at the center of the transit passage issue.7 This is a key issue because
the two major naval powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., in-
sisted early in the Conference's preparatory work on the necessity of
an assured right of transit for all vessels and aircraft through and over
straits. As negotiations proceeded, it was made plain to all concerned
that this question was paramount for these two powers.8
and there is a widespread feeling that some partial agreement may emerge from it if
a few divisive issues (mainly pertaining to the seabed regime) can be separated from
the great majority of issues on which substantial agreement exists. If this separation
cannot be made, there is a good chance the Conference will drag on for several years.
with state claims and counterclaims framing customary law. At this writing it is not
at all clear that the issues can be separated.
6. It no longer seems to be seriously doubted that a 12-mile territorial sea has been
established by customary international law, or soon will be unless a trend develops
toward even wider limits. The expectation underlying the Conference negotiations has
been that the treaty will recognize a 12-mile territorial sea and that there will be fur-
ther agreement clarifying new law for transit of straits. Despite this expectation, the
fact is that most straits of interest already fall within the claimed territorial sea of
adjoining states and most states already recognize these claims. The United States still
insists that it need not recognize territorial seas wider than three miles.
It is widely recognized that the willingness of states generally to accept a 12-mile
territorial sea depends upon a similar general acceptance of extended coastal jurisdic-
tion over an economic zone of 200 miles for other purposes, including especially con-
trol over resources. Cf. Revised Text, supra note 3, at 160-64 (Chapter III: The Ex-
clusive Economic Zone). Although there is general agreement on the concept of such
a zone, there continues to be sharp disagreement over its nature, particularly its in-
clusion or exclusion from the high seas, and its possible recognition as a zone si
generis.
7. Commentators have discussed this issue extensively. See R. OsGooD, A. HOLLICK.
C. PEARSON, & J. ORR, TOWARD A NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY: 1976 AND BEYOND 43-85
(Prepared for National Science Foundation 1975); Burke, Contemporary Law of
the Sea: Transportation, Communication and Flight, 2 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB.
ORD. 183, 215-21, 237-53 (1976); Cundick, International Straits: The Right of Ac-
cess, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 107 (1975); Grandison & Meyer, International Straits,
Global Communications, and the Evolving Law of the Sea, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
393 (1975); Knight, The 1971 United States Proposals on tire Breadth of the Terri-
torial Sea and Passage Through International Straits, 51 ORE. L. REV. 759 (1972):
McNees, Freedom of Transit Through International Straits, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 175
(1975); Osgood. U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law, 2 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1
(1974); Smith. An Analysis of the Strategic Attributes of International Straits: A
Geographical Perspective, 2 MAR. STUD. & MANAGEMENT 88 (1974); Yturriaga, Navi-
gation Through the Territorial Sea Including Straits Used for International Naviga-
tion, in HAZARDS OF MARITIME TRANSIT 85 (T. Clingan ed. 1973); F. De Rocher,
Freedom of Passage Through International Straits: Community Interest Amid Present
Controversy (Sea Grant Tech. Bull. No. 23, Univ. of Miami Sea Grant Program.
November 1972).
8. See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
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It is the purpose of this article to consider provisions in the Revised
Text dealing with passage through straits and especially to comment
on interpretations thereof which contend that the Revised Text does
not secure a right of submerged passage for submarines. Before pro-
ceeding to this task, it is useful to provide a brief background of the
development of the issue, focusing on the reasons for its emergence.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT
PASSAGE
The failure of the 1958 and 1960 LOS Conferences to agree on the
width of the territorial sea left undecided the critical question of the
permissible extension of national territory into the ocean. 9 In the ab-
sence of an explicit understanding, coastal nations proceeded in the
1950's and 1960's increasingly to claim a territorial sea of twelve
miles, with a few nations claiming limits as extensive as 200 miles.1 0 A
major concern arising from these expanded claims and their prolifera-
tion was the growing prospect of general acceptance of this limit as
9. These two conferences were the first two sponsored by the United Nations on
the law of the sea, and they were not wholly unsuccessful, even if the most critical
question was left unresolved. Four treaties were produced of which the most relevant
for present purposes is the Convention of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
See 2 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 131-43, U.N. Docs.
AICONF.13/L.52-.55 (1958).
Although the 1960 Conference failed by only one vote to adopt a six-mile territorial
sea, and could agree on no other limit either, this failure to set an explicit limit can-
not be interpreted to mean that states were, or are, free to establish any limit they
may choose. The 1958 and 1960 Conferences refused to accept proposals for such
discretionary authority and implicitly agreed that the territorial sea could not lawfully
exceed 12 miles. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
490-98, 559-61 (1962).
10. The evolution of these claims may be seen in the following table:
Territorial NUMBER OF TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS OVER TIME
Sea Claimed
(Naut'l Mi.) Year 3 4 5 6 9 10 12 18 30 50 100 130 200
Before
1930 32 5 5 1
1930 15 4 10 1
1958 41 4 1 11 1 1 11 4
1960 40 4 1 12 1 1 16 4
1973 27 4 11 1 52 1 3 1 1 1 9
1974 25 4 13 1 51 1 4 3 1 1 10
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customary law, which would include some critical straits within the
territorial sea of adjoining states. As a result, passage through these
straits would depend on the right of innocent passage under interna-
tional law rather than upon the right to freedom of navigation which
prevails on the high seas.11
Disquiet over this possible change in applicable legal principle
arose for three principal reasons, primarily military in character.
First, the doctrine of innocent passage established in the 1958 Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone12 provides for
a wide discretion in the coastal state to determine whether passage is
innocent, and this subjectivity in judgment might result in interference
with inoffensive passage. 13 Second, aircraft do not enjoy the right of
innocent passage.1 4 Third, submarines must travel on the surface in
order to exercise the right. 15 While the 1958 Convention provided
that the coastal state could not suspend innocent passage through
straits, as it could in other parts of the territorial sea, the above as-
pects of the innocent passage concept made its usefulness questionable
in the context of a wider territorial sea, at least in the eyes of the
major maritime states, i.e., the United States and the U.S.S.R. 16
Data for this chart was derived from BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS No. 36, NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURIS-
DICTION (3d rev. ed. 1975). Some states are not reflected in the figures in the chart.
The situation with respect to their territorial sea claims is as follows:
State Claim (naut'l mi.)
Republic of Korea 20-200 n.m. territorial sea
Lebanon No specific claim
Maldives Defined by geographical
coordinates; range: 3-55 n.m.
Nicaragua No limits specified
Philippines Based on archipelagic baselines
Id.
t1. See sources cited in note 7 supra.
12. 2 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 132-35. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/L.52 (1958) [herinafter cited as 1958 Convention].
13. Article 14(4) of the 1958 Convention provides as follows: "Passage is inno-
cent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with these articles and with other
rules of international law." Id. at 133. See McDOUGAL & BURKE. supra note 9. at 247-
69; Slonim. The Right of Innocent Passage and the 1958 Conference on the Law of
the Sea, 5 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 96 (1966).
14. Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944.
arts. 1-3, 5-6, 61 Stat. 1180. T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295; M. McDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL, & I. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 257 (1963).
15. Article 14(6) of the 1958 Convention provides: "Submarines are required to
navigate on the surface and show their flag." 1958 Convention, supra note 12, at 134.
16. The Soviet position was anomalous because it had long claimed a 12-mile
territorial sea and in the first two LOS Conferences in 1958 and 1960 its view was that
warships had no right of innocent passage. The change in the Soviet view coincided
with its emergence as a major naval power. The turnabout did not go unnoticed and
196
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The underlying concern of the two superpowers was that requiring
nuclear ballistic-missile submarines to transit straits on the surface
would compromise the security of key elements of their strategic de-
terrent forces. Surface passage might threaten to some degree the
ability of such submarines to be undetectable and hence invulnerable
to surprise attack. Thus the straits issue is linked by some to vital na-
tional security interests.17
There were understandable reasons for this uneasiness about the
developing law of the sea as it might affect straits and navigation.
Since the 1958 and 1960 LOS Conferences, a large number of new
nations had come into existence. Virtually all of them were developing
nations, and it would not be unexpected if their views on coastal au-
thority over straits were unsympathetic to those seriously interested in
protecting passage by submarines below the surface. Accordingly,
when members of the United Nations began to reconsider the law of
the sea, stimulated primarily by prospects for mining deep sea miner-
als, the United States and the U.S.S.R. took the opportunity to press
for an agreement continuing high seas rights of passage through
straits. Both nations placed special emphasis on this issue, but even in
the preparatory talks sharp differences of view were obvious.18
At the Caracas session of the Conference in 1974, the conferees
were unable to agree on a draft text or other formulation of a single
view, but a document was compiled showing the "main trends."'19 The
next session of the Conference, in Geneva in the spring of 1975, re-
sulted in the issuance of the Informal Single Negotiating Text (In-
formal Text) which was supposed to take account of the negotiations
but was neither a negotiated document nor intended to bind anyone.20
was denounced most vigorously by the People's Republic of China. Remarks of Mr.
Shen (People's Republic of China), Sub-Committee II of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed (36th mtg. of the subcomm.) at 2-5, U.N. Doc. A(AC.1381
SC.II/SR.36 (prov. sum. rec.; July 25, 1972).
17. Some observers do not believe that an adequate case has been made for this
concern or for a new law of the sea treaty containing a special right of transit through
straits. See note 80 infra.
18. See [1973] 1 Report of Sea-Bed Committee, supra note 1, at 50-51; [1972]
Report of Sea-Bed Committee, supra note 1, at 41-42. Cf. Remarks of Mr. Shen,
supra note 16.
19. Working paper of the Second Committee: main trends, 3 Third U.N. Conf.,
Annex II (Appendix 1) 107, 115-16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.8/REV.l (1974).
20. The Introduction to the Second Committee's part of the Informal Text stated
that the Text was to take "account of all formal and informal discussions and pro-
posals" and that "the text would be a basis for negotiation, rather than a negotiated
text or accepted compromise, and would not prejudice the position of any delegation."
Informal Text, supra note 2, at 153.
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Rather, it was intended to be a basis for negotiation. Nonetheless the
Chairman of the Second Committee, which dealt with the transit is-
sue, did select among proposals to incorporate specific provisions in
the Informal Text, and it is very likely that he sought to include prop-
ositions which would find acceptance.
At the next session in New York, in spring 1976, the Informal Text
was the main topic for consideration. It is of some importance for the
following discussion to take note of the procedure employed during
this session in the Second Committee for consideration of the In-
formal Text. Committee work took place only in informal sessions
(fifty-three were held) and followed a specific procedure. In an Introduc-
tory Note to the Revised Text the Chairman explained this procedure
as follows:
5. The guiding principle in revising the single text was to make such
changes as would make the text conform more to the views of delega-
tions, as expressed during discussion in the Committee. In my opinion,
very few of the over one thousand amendments proposed during the
session would achieve the purpose of making the text a more adequate
instrument for the fulfilment of the final objective of the Conference.
6. Early in its work the Committee agreed to follow a "rule of si-
lence," whereby delegations would refrain from speaking on an article
if they were essentially in agreement with the single text. Silence on
amendments would be interpreted as lack of support for such amend-
ments. The rule was to be applied flexibly and was not intended to
result in any arithmetic calculations or be taken as a form of indicative
vote. In my interpretations of the effect of this rule, I took into ac-
count the fact that with regard to certain issues, only those delegations
most directly involved would normally participate in the discussion.
Nevertheless, the rule allowed a general classification of the issues
before the Committee.21
The Chairman then noted that in terms of changes in the Revised
Text there were three categories of aricles. The largest category of ar-
ticles consisted of those where proposed amendments commanded
minimal support, hence these remained unchanged in the Revised
Text. Other articles were changed because either there was a "clear
trend favouring the inclusion of a particular amendment" or the
Chairman "was given a mandate to make a change within agreed
21. Revised Text, supra note 3, at 153.
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limits."'22 The third category of articles were those most needing nego-
tiation. On some of these the Chairman suggested a compromise or
pointed the way toward a solution. In other cases the Chairman re-
frained from making or suggesting a change, believing modification to
a text might be counterproductive.
The great majority of the articles affecting navigation and commu-
nication were left unchanged in the Revised Text and, as just noted,
this was primarily because there was insufficient support for change.
The question of the status of the economic zone is the only instance
where an article concerning navigation remained unchanged because
of a significant difference of view on the issue involved. The Revised
Text is largely the same as the Informal Text on other navigation is-
sues, including the provisions on transit passage, innocent passage,
and archipelagic passage. In short, it is fair to say that a large measure
of agreement exists on these problems.23
The two major purposes of special provisions on transit passage of
straits are (1) to secure a right for submarines and aircraft to pass re-
spectively, under and over straits which fall within the territorial sea;
and (2) to eliminate the competence of the coastal state to charac-
terize passage as non-innocent and, therefore, subject to exclusion.
Since the New York spring session ended in May 1976, some ques-
tions have been raised about portions of the Text concerning straits.24
Doubts have been expressed about whether the right of transit passage
includes a right of submerged passage because there is no explicit
22. Id.
23. At the fifth session the straits issue was considered a key question still to be
resolved, but it is evident that the differences on the matter are not widespread. The
Chairman of the Second Committee observed in his report that the Revised Text is
"an acceptable negotiating basis for the great majority of delegations" and that "some
States bordering straits said their acceptance of the text was conditional on the incor-
poration into it of certain changes aimed at achieving a better balance between their
interests and the interests of users of the straits." Report of Second Committee Chair-
man on the Fifth Session at 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.17 (Sept. 16, 1976).
24. A letter to the author from Senator Barry Goldwater, dated July 23, 1976,
reads as follows:
As a non-lawyer with Committee responsibilities covering the Law of the Sea ne-
gotiations, I am seeking your legal opinion of certain provisions in the "Revised
Single Negotiating Text," released on May 6, 1976, at the New York session of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Specifically, I am
interested in knowing whether or not the Text guarantees the United States rights
of submerged transit through straits which connect two areas of high seas or eco-
nomic zone and in which the territorial waters generated by the opposite coast-
lines of the straits states overlap.
Now, I should mention that members of the official U.S. delegation to the Law
of the Sea Conference tell us that the Text does guarantee the United States such
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mention of the latter in the Text.25 Recent comment also contends
that the Revised Text neither establishes a secure right of submerged
transit nor insulates transit passage from significant coastal state dis-
cretion to qualify passage as "nontransit" and, therefore, subject to
exclusion. 26 The remainder of this article examines these comments,
in the context of straits and archipelagoes, and suggests that they have
little substance.
II. CRITICISMS OF THE REVISED SINGLE
NEGOTIATING TEXT
Criticisms that have been made of the Revised Text can be summa-
rized as follows: First, the term "freedom of navigation" in Article 37
does not include a right of submerged transit. Second, even if the ne-
gotiators sought to include such a right, it is substantially qualified
and hedged by restrictions so that the Text does not clearly and un-
equivocally "guarantee" a right of submerged transit. Third, the refer-
rights. This is notwithstanding the fact that there apparently is no express men-
tion of submarines or submerged transit in the articles dealing with straits.
As I understand it, our negotiators contend:
(1) Article 37(1) guarantees the right of "transit passage" through straits.
Article 37(2) defines transit passage to include "freedom of navigation." This
"freedom of navigation" is understood to include freedom of submerged transit.
(2) Article 38 requires that ships exercising the right of transit passage shall
"refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of
continuous and expeditious transit." The term "normal mode of transit" is under-
stood to mean submerged transit for submarines. Article 19 (which provides "In
the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navi-
gate on the surface and show their flag") does not apply to territorial waters in
straits because it is included in the part of the Text that deals with territorial
waters (Chapter I) rather than the part that deals with straits (Chapter II).
Would you advise me whether "freedom of navigation," as used in international
law, includes freedom of submerged transit through territorial waters in straits?
What legal interpretation is to be given to the phrase "normal mode of transit"
as applied to submarines in territorial waters? Is it clear that Article 19 would not
apply to territorial waters in straits? Does the Text guarantee the United States'
rights of submerged transit through territorial waters in straits? If you should
wish to add any analysis not treated by these questions, please feel free to do so.
I realize this is quite a request to spring upon you, but I assure you that if you
do find time to answer, it will be of great practical use to me.
Letter from Senator Barry Goldwater to Professor William T. Burke (July 23, 1976)
(on file with the Washington Law Review).
25. H. Gary Knight, Analysis of the "Revised Single Negotiating Text" and the
Question of the Right of Submerged Transit Through International Straits (Aug. 1,
1976) (unpublished memorandum on file with the Washington Law Review) [herein-
after cited as Knight]; Statement of W. Michael Reisman (Aug. 5, 1976) (on file
with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Reisman]. The author is grate-
ful to Professors Knight and Reisman for making this material available.
26. Reisman, supra note 25.
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ence to "normal modes of transit" in Article 38 is not, for various
reasons, an authorization for submerged navigation of a strait. Fourth,
the provisions of Article 19 requiring surface transit by submarines in
the territorial sea may also be applicable to straits. Each of these criti-
cisms is discussed below.
A. "Freedom of Navigation" Does Not Include a Right of
Submerged Transit
There appears to be general agreement that the term "freedom of
navigation" in traditional international law refers to vessels on the
high seas and authorizes a broad freedom of operation and maneuver,
including military activities and practices, as well as freedom to stop
or move slowly in a particular area.27 The concept in its high seas
context does not simply connote movement from one place to another
but embraces a broad range of practices in use of the ocean floor,
water column, and space above. 28 No one seriously doubts that
freedom of navigation on the high seas includes the right of sub-
merged passage. 29
Although the term "freedom of navigation" is used in Article 37 to
refer to a right of transit passage in straits embraced by a territorial
sea, the argument is made by Professor H. Gary Knight that it is ac-
companied by so many qualifications and restrictions that, there being
no express mention of submerged passage, it was not intended to in-
27. The freedom to navigate and move about the oceans carrying out multiple
tasks has been the principal traditional component of freedom of the seas. For centu-
ries freedom of the seas meant freedom of navigation. Insofar as human activity on
the high seas requires the use of a mobile platform, the main doctrinal protection is
the doctrine of freedom of navigation. See generally 4 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw
501-633 (M. Whiteman ed., Dep't of State Pub. No. 7825, 1965); McDOUGAL &
BURKE, supra note 9, at 751-78.
28. The term "navigation" embraces such activities as surveillance, observation or
inspection; military maneuvers and operations involving the use of aircraft, surface
vehicles, submarines, and associated structures and installations; testing of equipment
and weapons systems; refueling operations; placing and retrieving objects and buoys;
and no doubt additional activities. See generally 4 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 27, at 543-51, 619-28.
29. This point has been challenged only in connection with the prospective estab-
lishment of exclusive economic zones in certain offshore areas for the benefit of coastal
states. The People's Republic of China proposed in the Sea-Bed Committee that free-
dom of navigation in such zones be limited to surface craft. Even in this instance it
should be noted that the exclusive economic zone is to be a regime separate and apart
from that of the high seas. See [1973] 3 Report of Sea-Bed Committee, supra note 1,
at 73.
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clude submerged passage. 30 The main qualifications mentioned are
the phrase "solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious tran-
sit" and the provisions of Articles 38-40 which set forth duties of
passing ships and the regulatory competence of the strait state. Be-
cause in his view each of these restrictions is inapplicable to high seas
"freedom of navigation," the latter term in this context means some-
thing so different that it cannot be interpreted to include submerged
transit unless it is expressly stated.
One difficulty with this specific contention and with other criticisms
of the Revised Text is that they rest almost completely on textual exe-
gesis and manipulation of words without regard for, and with virtually
no reference to, the negotiating context. There is a loss of plausibility
when the interpreter makes no attempt to take into account the issues
being negotiated, their origin, the contrasting views and proposals of
the principal participants, contemporary interpretations of these pro-
posals, and the formulation of the outcome in relation to these com-
munications among the parties in the negotiations. These factors assist
in determining the perspectives of those concerned. Observers can
expect difficulty in identifying the potential commitments embodied in
a draft text if observations fail to go below the surface of the terms
employed.31
In the present instance, ample evidence is available for under-
standing important features of the negotiating context, including the
nature of the issues involved, how and by whom they came to be iden-
tified and formulated, what specific proposals were made by various
participants for their resolution, and how these proposals were inter-
preted by negotiators.32 We do not have and may never have fully
30. Knight, supra note 25, at 1-4.
3 1. One authoritative work comments on document interpretation as follows: "It
is the grossest, least defensible exercise of arbitrary formalism to arrogate to one par-
ticular set of signs-the text of a document-the role of serving as the exclusive index
of the parties' shared expectations." M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & J. MILLER, THE
INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER xvii (1967).
32. The objective of interpreting the Revised Text is to "discover the shared expec-
tations that the parties to the relevant communications succeeded in creating in each
other." See id. at xvi. This task of discovery is obviously difficult in a meeting with
as many formal participants as the LOS Conference. But numbers are only a superfi-
cial component of the situation. Negotiations occur on a number of different levels,
the least important of which are the formal meetings. Other relevant meetings include
large, informal gatherings, designated negotiating groups, and exclusive but tiny in-
terest groups. For some notion of these complexities in the context of the straits issue.
see Miles. An Interpretation ofthe Geneva Proceedings-Part II, 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L.J. 303, 305-8 (1976). A full depiction of negotiations on the straits issue would
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adequate legislative histories of all of the negotiations since they were
largely on an "informal" basis with no summary or other public
record of them. There are, however, satisfactory indications of the
views of various parties which provide guidance concerning the expec-
tations they sought to project on the specific issue of the submerged
transit of submarines.
It has never been any secret that the United States considered it a
vital interest to secure a right of passage through straits which would
provide for a right of submerged transit resembling that established by
freedom of navigation on the high seas. The Soviet Union also left no
doubt that it placed a high value on the right of transit passage, in-
cluding submerged passage. Both communicated very clearly that sat-
isfactory resolution of this issue was the key to a successful outcome
for the Conference as a whole.33 On the other hand the opposing
views of straits states and others were made equally plain. Some
states opposed any right of passage by warships and specifically re-
jected the idea that submarines should have a right to pass in the
submerged mode.34
The issue of a right of transit overshadowed all other matters in the
LOS negotiations, beginning at least in 1971 when the Sea-Bed
Committee started preparatory work for the Conference. It is
common knowledge that it took two years of intensive negotiations to
draw up the list of subjects and issues with which the Conference was
require information about the separate deliberations of the Evensen group, the Group
of 77, the straits state group, the archipelagic group, and about bilateral links among
various of these participants. None of these groups met in open session and some meet-
ings were secret. Id. The analysis in this discussion is based solely on published
sources.
33. See Remarks of Ambassador Stevenson (United States), Sub-Committee II of
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed (8th mtg. of the subcomm.) at
2-3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.28 (prov. sum. rec.; Aug. 5, 1971); Stevenson &
Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1974); Remarks of Mr. Podserob (U.S.S.R.), Sub-Committee II of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed (28th mtg. of the subcomm.) at 2-4, U.N. Doc.
AIAC.138ISC.IIlSR'28 (prov. sum. rec.; Mar. 29, 1972); 2 Third U.N. Conf., Second
Committee (14th mtg.) 140-41, U.N. Doc. AICONF.62C.2/SR.14 (1975) (remarks
of Mr. Sapozhnikov, Uk. S.S.R.).
The U.S.S.R. has explicitly referred to a "package deal" in which agreement on some
major seabed issues is dependent upon agreement on establishment of a 12-mile terri-
torial sea, freedom of passage through straits, and fishing adjacent to the territorial sea.
See [1971] Report of Sea-Bed Committee, supra note 1, at 67 (explanatory note),
U.N. Doc. AIAC.138/43; 3 Third U.N. Conf. 214, U.N. Doec. A/CONF.62/C.2L.38
(1975).
34. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
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to deal. 35 It may not be common knowledge that at the end of these
two years the crucial roadblock to final agreement on this list was the
difference on the wording to be used in expressing the straits question.
The compromise formulation on this issue3 6 was regarded with such
gravity by the United States delegation that acceptance of the wording
on behalf of the United States was referred back to Washington and
personally decided by President Nixon after hearing opposing view-
points on the matter. This incident reflects the very high importance
of the straits issue to the United States. No delegation in the Confer-
ence is unaware of this attitude.
The contrasting positions are fully revealed in the key proposals by
the straits states and Fiji, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom
and the U.S.S.R. on the other. 37 Neither of the former proposals offers
assurance of a right of submerged passage. The straits states proposal
provides exactly the opposite, requiring authorization for passage of
warships and, in addition, specifying that submarines must travel on
the surface. The Fiji proposal is less restrictive because it recognizes
innocent passage for warships and would allow submerged passage if
the coastal state has been given prior notification of passage and the
submarine uses designated sealanes where required by the coastal
state.38 Neither proposal mentions freedom of navigation in straits.
The proposals of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. both ex-
pressly provide for the freedom of navigation and overflight through
straits. The summary record of the discussion at the time these and
other straits proposals were introduced fully establishes that "the
freedom of navigation and overflight" in straits was intended to incor-
porate some high seas rights in a new straits regime called the right of
35. See [1972] Report of Sea-Bed Committee, supra note 1, at 5-8. One reason it
took two years to negotiate the list was the insistence by many participants that the
formulation of an item prejudge the resolution of an issue. Many states, for example.
opposed inclusion of an item on "free transit" or "right of transit."
36. Item 4 of the list reads as follows:
4. Straits used for international navigation
4.1. Innocent passage
4.2 Other related matters including the question of the right of transit
Id. at 5. The compromise item is 4.2. This formulation was strongly opposed by Defense
Department representatives within the United States delegation.
37. 3 Third U.N. Conf. 192-95, U.N. Doc. AICONF.62C.2/L.16 (1975) (Malay-
sia, Morocco, Oman, and Yemen); id. at 196-98, U.N. Doc. AICONF.62/C.2/L.19
(Fiji); id. at 183-86, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62C.2L.3 (United Kingdom); id. at 189-
90, U.N. Doc. AICONF.621C.21L.I 1 (U.S.S.R. et al.).
38. Id. at 196-97, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.19 (1975).
204
Vol. 52: 193, 1977
Submerged Passage
transit passage.39 The United Kingdom delegate introduced its pro-
posal by noting that the acceptance of a twelve-mile territorial sea
resulted in eliminating a strip of high seas in straits and created a need
"to ensure that unrestricted navigation through those vital links in the
world network of communications should remain available for use by
the international community. '40 This explanation quite clearly links
the former legal position in straits, i.e., high seas and freedom of navi-
gation, with a new regime that would "ensure. . . unrestricted navi-
gation. 41 The term "freedom of navigation" was used to describe the
right of transit passage. It strikes one as an eminently reasonable in-
terpretation, in view of this explanation, to construe the term
"freedom of navigation" as embracing submerged passage, especially
in light of the fact that mention of this freedom is unaccompanied by
any restrictions which would suggest that only surface transit was in-
tended. This interpretation seems amply comfirmed by the contempo-
rary observations of other delegations, particularly including those
opposed to the concept of transit passage.
Statements by Sri Lanka, Egypt, Peru, and Spain, 42 in commenting
both on the United Kingdom proposal and on a United States inter-
vention on the subject, are especially revealing of the contemporary
understanding of freedom of navigation in this context. Each of these
delegations questioned the need for, and desirability of, submerged
passage for submarines. The comments, questions, and proposals ad-
vanced by these delegations are virtually impossible to explain unless
they understood that submerged passage was intended to be included
in the concept of "freedom of navigation" in straits. In obvious as-
sumption that submerged passage was included in transit passage,
Egypt and Peru posed extremely pointed questions on the submarine
issue,43 while Sri Lanka in identifying specific safeguards for coastal
security in connection with passage by warships conspicuously
omitted any mention of requiring surface transit by submarines. 44
39. See 2 Third U.N. Conf., Second .Committee (1 lth-15th mtgs.) 123-42, U.N.
Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR. 1-15 (1975).
40. Id. at 125.
41. id.
42. Id. at 126 (Sri Lanka), 131 (Egypt), 131-32 (Peru), and 136-37 (Spain).
43. Egypt asked "how the coastal State could verify whether a submarine refrained
from testing weapons of any kind during its passage through straits if it remained sub-
merged." Id. at 13 1. Peru asserted that concealment of submarines "could only be for
far from innocent reasons" and hoped that "further explanations would be forthcoming
on the subject of submarines." Id. at 132.
44. Id. at 126. This statement could also be consistent with a view that submerged
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The response by the United States to the various questions raised by
other delegations is most enlightening. In specific answer to the ques-
tion about submarines by Egypt, Ambassador Stevenson addressed the
issue of coastal security interests and submerged passage and stated
unequivocally that the United States was seeking a right of submerged
transit. 45 In context it is amply clear that the United States believed
that freedom of navigation in the United Kingdom proposal included
the right of submerged transit. The detailed United States rejoinder to
the statements by Egypt and others simply loses its meaning unless
there was a general perception that the United States proposal would
include a right of submerged transit. The tenor as well as specific
segments of this debate at Caracas leaves little doubt that the partici-
pants shared a common view that free transit meant inter alia sub-
merged transit.
This impression becomes virtually a certainty when one examines
the Spanish statement 46 on July 23, 1974. The Spanish delegate
noted:
The drafts in documents AICONF.62C.2L.3 [United Kingdom pro-
posal], 11 [East European and U.S.S.R. proposal], and 15 [Denmark
and Finland proposal], like the draft submitted by the United States in
1971 and the one submitted by Italy in 1973, made no distinction
between merchant ships and warships, and there was one very signifi-
cant element in all those texts: the provision that submarines should
navigate on the surface and show their flag had been dropped. It
would seem then that the aim was to allow submarines to pass through
the ocean space under the sovereignty of another State without that
State's knowledge. 47
If one compares the above proposals it will be seen that not one
makes any explicit reference to submerged passage as part of transit
passage, yet the Spanish representative had no difficulty in perceiving
that they would drop the requirement of surface transit. All of the
passage was not considered part of the proposed free navigation in straits. Neverthe-
less, the detailed character of the statement, its reference to "current realities." and its
occurrence in the midst of a discussion replete with references to submerged passage
combine to indicate strongly that the compromise being proposed was intended to per-
mit submerged passage subject only to a notification requirement sufficiently flexible
to allow passage at essentially unidentified times.
45. Id. at 135.
46. Id. at 136-37.
47. Id. at 137.
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proposals, however, refer to the right of freedom of navigation in
straits. It is unmistakable that this concept was understood to include
the right to pass submerged.
After this pointed debate and further informal negotiations, it must
be seen as significant that both the Informal and the Revised Texts
make provision for freedom of transit in straits in terms which are
identical to those of the United Kingdom proposal. Under the rule of
silence employed by the Second Committee at the fourth session,48 the
majority of delegations indicated "essential agreement" with the In-
formal Text provisions on this issue and these are retained unchanged
in the Revised Text. Even more significantly, the Chairman of the
Second Committee stated in his report on the fifth session that the
straits provisions, still in the form identical to the United Kingdom
proposal, appear "to provide an acceptable negotiating basis for the
great majority of delegations. '49 In view of this record there seems to
be little room for question that the term "freedom of navigation".in
the Revised Text includes submerged passage.
Professor Knight also appears to argue that submerged passage is
excluded because the phrase "solely for the purpose of continuous and
expeditious transit" qualifies the exercise of "freedom of navigation"
under Article 37 of the Revised Text. His view is that "freedom of
navigation" cannot be given its traditional meaning when bound by
such a limitation. He concludes that the drafters "must have [had]
something else in mind when they use [d] the term 'freedom of navi-
gation.' "50
One may agree that the framers of Article 37(2) did not mean to
carry over and to protect the whole panorama of operational practices
protected by freedom of navigation in its traditional usage. But to
acknowledge this simply poses the more precise question: what com-
ponents of the old concept are now protected in straits and what are
not. The negotiating history briefly summarized above5' strongly sug-
gests that submerged passage is one such aspect of transit passage.
Certainly the restriction in the phrase "continuous and expeditious
passage" does not by its terms exclude submerged passage. Passage in
48. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
49. Report of Second Committee Chairman on the Fifth Session at 8, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/L.17 (Sept. 16, 1976).
50. Knight, supra note 25, at 3.
51. See notes 31-43 and accompanying text supra.
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the submerged mode can be as "continuous and expeditious" as sur-
face movement. Nothing in the negotiations even remotely suggests
that this qualification was thought to modify the mode of making
transit other than by excluding inconsistent operations.
The other set of qualifications allegedly relevant to a conclusion
that freedom of navigation in Article 37(2) does not include sub-
merged passage is found in the apparently innocuous requirement that
transit passage be exercised "in accordance with this Chapter." This is
said to include Articles 38-40 which, it is asserted,5 2 provide for du-
ties inconsistent with freedom of navigation. Professor Reisman also
appears to urge that Article 38 and other requirements of transit pas-
sage totally exclude submerged passage or, at least, constitute signifi-
cant qualifications on the latter right. For him they impose such sig-
nificant qualifications that it is "not a necessary interpretation or even
most reasonable of constructions" 53 to conclude that freedom of navi-
gation is understood to include freedom of submerged transit. Presum-
ably the most reasonable interpretation is to be preferred, and appar-
ently in that case Article 38 would exclude a right of submerged
transit.
Although the various duties mentioned in Articles 38 and 39 may
be inconsistent with traditional freedom of navigation, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that submerged passage is excluded
from the right of transit passage. For example, a submerged sub-
marine would have no unique difficulty in proceeding "without delay"
through a strait as required by Article 38(1)(a). Similarly such a sub-
marine can as easily as any vessel refrain from activities extraneous to
the normal mode of continuous and expeditious transit in accordance
with Article 38(1)(c). A submarine can also comply with specified
sealanes and traffic separation schemes and would be expected to do
so by Article 39. Finally, a submarine can comply with the coastal
state's permissible laws and regulations as specified in Article 40 be-
cause such regulations are compatible with submerged passage. In-
deed Article 40(2) seeks to insure that compatibility by specifying that
coastal laws and regulations shall not have the "practical effect of
denying, hampering, or impairing the right of transit passage as de-
fined in this section."
52. Knight, supra note 25, at 3-4.
53. Reisman. supra note 25, at 3.
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B. The Right of Submerged Transit Is Overly Qualified
In his overall assessment of the Revised Text on submerged pas-
sage, Professor Reisman states that it is "not outlandish or preposter-
ous" to interpret "transit passage" as including a right of submerged
passage. 54 But he says that Article 37(2) is not a "clear and unequiv-
ocal statement for a number of reasons," and that the right of transit
passage is "laden with significant qualifications unknown to the
'freedom of navigation.' -55 The reasons he advances are, in fact, the
qualifications which are assertedly either incompatible with or un-
known to freedom of navigation, including the word "solely" in Ar-
ticle 37(2), Article 38(1)(b) and (d), and Article 40(1).
Perhaps the most significant alleged qualification mentioned56 is
Article 38(1)(b) which states that vehicles in transit passage shall "re-
frain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of States bordering straits, or in
any other manner in violation of [sic] the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." One difficulty
with the contention that this article may restrict the right to sub-
merged transit is the apparent assumption that vessels engaged in
freedom of navigation on the high seas (assuming a strait were part of
the high seas) are somehow exempted from the same obligation. It is
reasonably clear that the law concerning impermissible coercion, as
defined in the United Nations Charter from which this language of
Article 38 is derived, is not displaced by or subservient to the principle
of freedom of navigation. 57 Hence explicit recognition that "transit
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Professor Reisman attaches unexplained significance to the use of the term
"solely" in Article 37(2) to qualify the "purpose of continuous and expeditious tran-
sit." In citing this provision (and Article 38) he makes the immaterial point that this
qualifies the high seas concept of freedom of navigation. Such a limitation, however,
is not inconsistent with a right of submerged passage. As noted above, such passage is
not inconsistent with continuous and expeditious movement.
Article 38(l)(d) has also been identified as a significant qualification on the right of
submerged transit. Reisman, supra note 25, at 3 Apparently the concern over this
article, which says that ships in transit passage shall comply with other relevant provi-
sions of the chapter, is that it might be taken to refer to Article 43 (providing for
innocent -passage in those straits to which transit passage is inapplicable). But it is
frivolous to suggest that among the "relevant provisions" of the straits chapter, with
which vessels in transit must comply, is a provision that is expressly applicable only
to straits to which transit passage is not applicable.
57. Where coercion reaches a high level of intensity, such as may justify a respond-
ing use of coercion in self-defense, the relevant prescriptions and policies are those
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passage" must conform to the U.N. Charter is hardly a significant
qualification unknown to freedom of navigation on the high seas. If a
strait state were confronted with an impermissible use of force justi-
fying measures of self-defense, the responsible vessel could not be
shielded from such use of force by the principle of freedom of naviga-
tion or of transit passage.
It seems clear from the Revised Text that the activities of sub-
merged transit or overflight in and of themselves do not necessarily
constitute an impermissible use or threat of force or coercion. Such a
conclusion would require examination of a wider context than merely
these activities alone. Thus, while a vessel or aircraft in transit might
use impermissible coercion, the mere fact of passage alone cannot es-
tablish that fact. A strait state could not, consistently with the Text,
simply declare without regard to context that all submerged passage
or overflight of a strait would be considered incompatible with the
U.N. Charter so as to make the right of transit inapplicable. If it were
otherwise, strait states could by simple unilateral assertion divest the
Revised Text of significant meaning. Nothing in the record suggests
this is a plausible interpretation. The significance of Article 38(1)(b)
as a restriction on submerged transit and overflight may perhaps best
be seen when it is understood that its deletion from the Text would
not materially change the legal obligations of vessels exercising the
right of transit passage.
Article 42 of the Text provides that " [t] here shall be no suspension
of transit passage" 58 by strait states. This is the counterpart to Article
43(2) which prohibits suspension of innocent passage in straits.59 The
latter is identical to Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.60 Elsewhere in the territorial sea
the coastal state can suspend the right of innocent passage. This
means that a particular vessel which otherwise qualifies for the right
directly related to the permissibility of such coercion and "the policies and prescrip-
tions concerning the law of the sea . . . are more or less completely displaced insofar
as the question of permissibility is concerned." McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 9, at
266.
58. Article 42 reads: "States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage
and shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within
or over the strait of which it has knowledge. There shall be no suspension of transit
passage." Revised Text, supra note 3, at 160.
59. Article 43 comprises Section 3 of the straits chapter and provides for innocent
passage in certain straits to which transit passage is inapplicable. Id.
60. 1958 Convention, supra note 12, at 134.
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may not be able to use it because its availabilty has been suspended.
When suspension is prohibited, the coastal (strait) state can only ex-
clude passage for cause, i.e., that a particular instance of passage is
not innocent or does not meet the conditions of transit passage. The
significance of this is that straits cannot be completely closed to pas-
sage by any and all vessels. The strait state can deal with passage
only on a piecemeal basis rather than wholesal&.
In light of this background it is simply irrelevant to observe, as has
Professor Reisman, that the Text provision prohibiting suspension of
transit passage "is not the same as saying 'There shall be no suspen-
sion of passage.' "61 He adds: "In other words, a state bordering a
strait might unilaterally determine that a particular transit, in given
circumstances, violates . . .Article 38(1)(b), hence, is not a 'transit
passage' in the meaning of the Convention and may either be prohib-
ited entirely or permitted only upon surfacing. 62 Of course a vessel
which engages in an activity that is not an exercise of transit passage
can be excluded from passage and the Text provides for this possi-
bility in Article 37(3).63 But this coastal competence is limited to spe-
cific transits because the coastal state cannot suspend transit passage.
The singular purpose of this anti-suspension provision in Article 42
is to confine coastal state competence to assessments of individual
instances of passage.
In asserting that transit passage has qualifications which are "in-
compatible with the high seas' notion of freedom of navigation," it has
also been suggested by Professor Reisman that one might consider the
relevance of Article 40(1) "as a possible authorization to the strait
state to insist on surface transit of submarines through busy straits as a
safety regulation. '64 To evaluate this contention it is necessary to con-
61. Reisman, supra note 25, at 3.
62. Id. (original emphasis). Of course a nation might unilaterally make any con-
ceivable claim, but other nations are not bound to accept. In the Corfu Channel Case,
the International Court of Justice rejected the Albanian attempt to impose its unilat-
eral view that British warships threatening force in the Corfu Channel within the
Albanian territorial sea were not in innocent passage. The Court found that the war-
ships had a right of innocent passage and were properly exercising it. Corfu Channel
Case, [1949] I.CJ. 4, 30-32. A vessel exercising the right of transit passage certainly
could reject and resist a forceful, unilateral attempt to deny transit passage contrary
to an LOS Conference treaty.
63. Article 37(3) reads: "Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of
transit passage through a strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of
the present Convention." Revised Text, supra note 3, at 159.
64. Reisman, supra note 25, at 3.
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sider Article 40 in its entirety. First, paragraph 1 confers prescriptive
competence on the strait state "subject to the provisions of this sec-
tion," which is the section establishing and defining the right of transit
passage. This makes it difficult, at the least, to argue that the strait
state can use its regulatory authority to qualify a right granted in an-
other provision of the same section. Second, if this is not already
clear, paragraph 3 adds that the application of coastal laws shall not
"have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the
right of transit passage as defined in this section." Requiring surface
transit simply destroys the right of transit passage for submarines and
would appear to be wholly inconsistent with paragraph 3. The conclu-
sion is that Article 40(1) is not a significant qualification upon the
right of submerged transit established by Article 37.
C. "Normal Modes of Transit" Does Not Authorize Submerged
Navigation of a Strait
Among other critical commentary upon the Revised Text, Professor
Knight contends that "normal modes of transit" as employed in Ar-
ticle 38(1)(c) does not refer to submerged transit, is not an authoriza-
tion therefor, and ought to be understood as meaning surface
transit.65 Professor Reisman thinks the term "normal" might or might
not mean submerged transit, because the signification of "normal"
depends upon a great many variables in a given instance. 66
As Professor Knight observes, Article 38 is not intended by itself to
establish a right of submerged passage but rather to provide for the
duties of vessels in transit. Although it is therefore correct to conclude
that Article 38 is not itself an authorization for submerged passage,
the Article does anticipate the exercise of the right of transit passage
in the submerged mode. Because Article 38 uses the term "normal
modes of . . .transit" it seems clear that the right of transit passage
contemplates vehicles which differ in their method of movement in-
sofar as they operate in their "normal mode." The requirement of
normality defines the obligations of a vehicle, in terms of its permis-
sible activities during passage, according to its chosen mode of transit,
i.e., whether it travels under, on, or over the water. It is rather difficult
65. Knight, supra note 25, at 4-7.
66. Reisman, supra note 25, at 4.
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to perceive what other references normality might have when em-
ployed in an article dealing with vehicles having such different oper-
ating characteristics as aircraft, submarines, and surface vessels.
The critical comments of Professors Knight and Reisman appear to
be mostly hypothetical excursions into possible references of the term
"normal mode of transit," undertaken largely without reference to the
negotiations and the purposes sought. Their. commentaries pose the
question involved quite differently. Professor Knight inquires into the
"legal content" of the phrase and examines prior agreements to deter-
mine if there is an agreed meaning for it. He concludes that if there is
any uniformity in prior usage it is that surface transit is required for
submarines in the territorial sea.67 For Professor Reisman, in contrast,
the question of "normal mode" is a factual one to be answered for
every single incident of passage by taking into account the type of
vessel and numerous other, highly variable factors.68
The more important issue raised about Article 38(1)(c) is whether
the right to travel submerged depends upon factors varying with every
separate instance of passage. Assuming that Article 37 establishes a
right of submerged passage as a general principle, does Article 38-
make the availability of that right contingent upon the coastal state's
interpretation of what is "normal" in any particular situation? It
seems highly unlikely that proponents of the phrase "normal modes
of... transit," who favored the right of submerged transit, sought to
provide a right whose availability was so variable that it might change
not only day by day but also hour by hour. It virtually boggles the
mind to conceive that negotiators contending over a highly critical,
sensitive, and even dangerous issue would seriously consider a provi-
sion that could lead to recurrent disputes'over what was "normal" in
an ever-changing context.
A far more reasonable interpretation is consistent with a variable
concept of the term "normal." It may be acknowledged that a sub-
marine might occasionally travel on the surface in a strait rather than
67. Knight, supra note 25, at 5-6. The relevance of prior usage is not self-evident
in interpreting draft treaty provisions resulting from, and identical to, proposals made
for the very purpose of replacing prior law on the matter. Under prior law submarines
were required to pass on the surface in order to exercise the right of innocent passage
and in compliance therewith submarines might normally travel on the surface. The
idea of proposing "freedom of navigation" in straits was to change this expectation
and permit other behavior.
68. Reisman, supra note 25, at 4.
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submerged because it is safer to do so or offers prospect for more ex-
peditious passage. The choice of the mode of travel, however, would
remain that of the flag state and not that of the coastal state. In this
interpretation, Article 38 recognizes that a vehicle may be engaged in
either surface, submerged, or air transit and it enjoins a vehicle in
whatever mode from engaging in any activities not incident to that
mode. Article 38 does not command one mode or another in any par-
ticular circumstance but does prohibit such activities as are not inci-
dent to whatever mode is employed by the vehicle.
In this view a submarine is in a normal mode of passage when it
operates submerged and its obligations or duties are measured in that
light. On the other hand the submarine might pass on the surface and
its obligations would then take that mode into account. The important
point is that Article 38 does not authorize the coastal state to deter-
mine what is a "normal" mode of transit each time a vehicle ap-
proaches a strait. It does specify that a vessel in transit passage, in
whatever mode it determines to use in light of its operating character-
istics and other relevant features of the context, shall only engage in
conduct which is an incident of such mode of passage.
D. Article 19 May Require Surface Transit in Straits
A final critique of the Revised Text is that it is not clear (or not self-
evident) that Article 19,69 requiring surface transit by submarines in
the territorial sea, is inapplicable to the territorial sea in straits. The
arguments again vary. Professor Knight derives his view that this is an
arguable point from consideration of Article 33 which provides that
the regime of transit passage in certain straits "shall not in other re-
spects affect the status of the waters forming such straits." 70 To this he
adds the proposition that submerged passage is not expressly per-
mitted through straits and concludes that Article 33 means that these
straits remain as territorial sea to which Article 19 is applicable. He
nevertheless considers that this matter is arguable in light of Article 43
which provides only for innocent passage in straits to which transit
passage is inapplicable. 7 1
69. Article 19, entitled "Submarines and other underwater vehicles," provides: "In
the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate
on the surface and to show their flag." Revised Text, supra note 3, at 156.
70. Id. at 158.
71. Knight, supra note 25, at 7-9.
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Apart from the clear provision of Article 43, the main weakness of
this argument is the notion that submerged passage is not made a part
of transit passage by the Text. Article 33 loses considerable point if
transit passage is not substantially different from innocent passage in
the territorial sea. Virtually the only important differences between
innocent and transit passage are the rights of submerged passage and
overffight; if these rights are not appurtenant to transit passage, Ar-
ticle 33 approaches meaninglessness. The regime of transit passage
would then have hardly any characteristics differentiating the waters
in straits from the territorial sea. On the other hand, acknowledge-
ment of these rights stresses the importance of preservation in Article
33 of the remaining coastal state authority over internal waters and
territorial sea in straits. There would be no need to preserve coastal
state authority over territorial sea or internal waters if transit passage
is by definition compatible with such authority.
Professor Reisman reaches the view that this matter is not unequiv-
ocal by incorporating Article 19 into the definition of innocent pas-
sage in Article 43, which he argues might be a relevant provision ap-
plicable under Article 38(1)(d) to all transit pasaage.72 This reasoning
is extremely fragile in light of the fact that Article 43 is expressly ap-
plicable only in straits to which transit passage is inapplicable. Pro-
fessor Reisman does not press this point very vigorously. He phrases
his line of argument in a highly qualified fashion and seems especially
reluctant to assert that Article 43 is a relevant provision for ships in
transit passage.
III. SUBMERGED PASSAGE IN ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS
Some of the critical comment on the transit passage question may
also be relevant to archipelagic passage which is dealt with by a sepa-
rate section of the Text.73 The specific issue is again whether the right
of archipelagic sea lanes passage provided in the archipelagic chapter
includes submerged passage where the relevant provisions do not spe-
72. Reisman, supra note 25, at 4-5.
73. Chapter VII of the Revised Text is entitled "Archipelagic States" and is de-
signed to establish arrangements for the special situations presented by archipelagoes.
Revised Text, supra note 3, at 170-72. There is a close connection between the straits
chapter and the archipelagic chapter and the textual provisions on rights of passage
and on coastal state prescriptive authority in the two chapters are very similar or
identical. Cf. Miles, supra note 32, at 304-07 (background discussion).
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cifically mention such passage. As with straits, the criticisms do not
have merit as applied to archipelagic sea lanes passage, for much the
same reasons.
The definition of the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in Ar-
ticle 125 closely resembles but is not identical to the corresponding
definition of transit passage in Article 37.74 There are three major dif-
ferences between the two: (1) Article 37 refers to "freedom" and Ar-
ticle 125 to "rights" of navigation and overflight; (2) Article 125 re-
fers to navigation and overflight "in the normal mode" and Article 37
does not; and (3) Article 37 uses the modifying term "solely" before
"for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit," but this term
does not appear in Article 125. Reasonably interpreted, these appear
to be textual differences without substantive importance other than
possibly mediating differences in negotiating positions.
The distinction between "freedom" and "right" in this context
seems insignificant as the two terms are simply different formulations
of the same concept. The freedoms of navigation and overflight on the
high seas are often, indeed very commonly, referred to as rights of
navigation and overflight; apart from the Revised Text there are no
comparable rights of navigation and overflight in another part of the
ocean. In both straits and archipelagic waters, the objective of the
Revised Text is to preserve high seas rights, or freedoms, except as
they are explicitly modified by the new arrangement. This is especially
significant for archipelagic waters because their recognition is a new
development in international law and embraces very large areas for-
merly part of the high seas.
Despite the virtual identity of the terms "rights" and "freedoms,"
the addition of the phrase "in the normal mode" in Article 125 pro-
vides added assurance that submerged passage is part of the right of
archipelagic sea lanes passage. In contrast to the straits provisions, the
phrase is used here as part of the description of the basic right. When
so used, the term "rights of navigation and overflight in the normal
mode" refers to the right to operate vessels and aircraft as they are
74. Article 125(3) provides:
Archipelagic sea lanes passage is the exercise in accordance with the present Con-
vention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit between one part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive
economic zone.
Revised Text, supra note 3, at 172.
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designed to be operated and as responsible flag state officials may de-
cide to use them. The term thus appears to have the same meaning as
it does in Article 38(1)(c), except that here it is part of the description
of the right rather than an auxiliary term which helps clarify the scope
of a right elsewhere created.
Professor Reisman's suggestion in the straits context is that the term
"normal" is "quite variable" and that such "mode of transit" for sub-
marines might differ "according to such factors as type of channel,
density of traffic, safety factors, nature of mission, rules of the road
and so on."'7 5 If this interpretation were applied to Article 125 to sug-
gest that the right of submerged archipelagic passage depends on what
is normal in a specific context, the "right" thereby established would
be extremely indefinite and its existence would be so contingent on
time and particular circumstances that for practical purposes it would
be unavailable.76 It seems extremely unlikely that the shared expecta-
tions of those who negotiated Article 125 were that the right of sub-
merged archipelagic passage would turn on density of traffic or the
state of weather or stage of tide as impinging on safety, or on the dif-
fering conformations of land and water found in numerous archipela-
goes around the globe. Nothing in the record of the negotiations sup-
'ports such an interpretation. Such factors are entirely too ephemeral
to be bases for an important legal right.
There is evidence within the Revised Text itself that these factors
are irrelevant to the right of submerged archipelagic passage. Coastal
state competence to deal with traffic density, safety of navigation, and
rules of the road, is spelled out in Article 40 which is applicable mu-
tatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage.77 Article 40(2) as
incorporated by Article 126 provides that laws and regulations con-
cerning these matters shall not "have the practical effect of denying,
hampering, or impairing" the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.
Coastal regulations requiring, due to the factors noted above, surface
transit by submarines would appear totally inconsistent with the right
75. Reisman, supra note 25, at 4; see note 68 and accompanying text supra.
76. In Article 125 the term "normal mode" is a part of the definition of the right
of archipelagic passage while in Article 38 it is part of a provision concerning the
duties of.ships and aircraft during passage. It is accordingly a more critical question
of interpretation in connection with archipelagic passage. Professor Reisman's com-
ments are confined to the meaning of the phrase in Article 38. The extrapolation to
Article 125 is mine for the purpose of this discussion.
77. Article 126 provides as follows: "Articles 38, 40 and 42 apply mutatis mutan-
dis to archipelagic sea lanes passage." Revised Text, supra note 3, at 172.
217
Washington Law Review
of archipelagic sea lanes passage and hence tantamount to a denial or
at least a substantial impairment of that right.
The omission of the word "solely" before "continuous and expedi-
tious transit" in the archipelagic articles also seems unimportant in
terms of the right of submerged archipelagic passage. It perhaps re-
lates to the more likely possibility (than in straits) that vessels in
transit would be calling at ports within the archipelago or in neigh-
boring states. Indeed the Revised Text on straits contains a new provi-
sion to assure that the right of transit there established includes entry
for visiting at ports within straits.78 The absence of a similar amend-
ment in the archipelagic articles suggests that those articles contem-
plate such transit visits, which might be barred if "solely" had been
included. The significance of the term "continuous and expeditious
transit" is that vehicles are not to sojourn in waters outside ports nor
to engage in maneuvers and operations other than simple movement
through the area. Hence this term signifies that archipelagic passage
does not authorize the same operations as does the right of freedom of
navigation on the high seas.
IV. CONCLUSION
The major reason for considering the allegations that the Revised
Text does not secure United States interests in submerged passage of
straits is that the pertinent Revised Text provisions may very well be
adopted without substantial change, if a treaty is concluded in the
reasonably near future. Most observers believe this will be the case
because there appears to be general agreement already on these
points. The only parties considerably dissatisfied are straits states,
which suggests that they believe the Text does not serve their interests.
The major maritime states appear to be content, especially the United
States. A recent letter from the representative of the United States Sec-
retary of Defense on LOS Conference matters expresses the American
view as follows:
Throughout these protracted negotiations, the United States has let
it be known that we could not become a party to a treaty that did not
accommodate our national security interests in submerged transit and
overflight of straits connecting high seas to high seas. Essentially, what
78. Article 37(2), Revised Text, supra note 3, at 159.
218
Vol. 52: 193, 1977
Submerged Passage
we seek is freedom of navigation (i.e., submerged transit) and over-
flight for the purpose of transit in straits connecting high seas to high
seas. We oppose the restrictions of innocent passage in such
straits . ..
The chapter on straits in Part Two of the Revised Single Negoti-
ating Text, which we have every reason to believe will be incorporated
into any treaty upon which the Law of the Sea Conference might
agree, provides in Article 37 for the right 6f "transit passage" in
straits connecting high seas to high seas. Transit passage is defined as
the exercise of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait. The United
States and other maritime powers insisted on the use of the words
"freedom of navigation and overflight" precisely because of their use
in the High Seas Convention. Thus, submerged transit and overflight,
under a new designation of "transit passage," is assured in straits con-
necting high seas to high seas. Indeed, no doubt has been expressed in
the Law of the Sea Conference that this is the result. In fact, States
opposed to submerged transit specifically proposed amendments re-
quiring submarines to surface which we, of course, rejected as did the
Conference itself.79
Once the LOS agreement is adopted by the Conference, it will be
subject to ratification. In the United States, the Constitution requires
that the President secure the advice and consent of the Senate before
the treaty may be ratified. When this question comes to the Senate, it
is possible that among other objections to acceptance it will be urged
that the treaty does not secure the United States' interest in submerged
passage. If the eventual treaty embodies the provisions of the Revised
Text this view should be rejected. If the United States Senate refuses
consent to ratification, it ought to be based on much more substantial
grounds than the objections discussed herein concerning the availa-
bility of submerged passage.
If the LOS Conference fails to produce an agreed treaty text, a con-
tingency that now seems likely due to continuing differences over the
seabed regime, the Revised Text may become important because it is
widely considered to reflect the law on important issues. If so, the
conclusion reached here is that in certain straits submarines would
have a right to pass submerged. Unless the Text is modified to provide
79. Letter from Stuart P. French to Senator John C. Stennis (Aug. 11, 1976)
(on file with the Washington Law Review).
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for notice and authorization of intended passage, it is also the view of
this writer that such a right does not accord with desirable community
policy. 80
80. Even at this late date no showing has been made that the maritime powers
require a right of submerged passage to protect their submarine deterrent forces. On
the other hand, coastal nations have an understandable concern about the possible
unannounced use of national territory by such foreign military craft. An appropriate
balance of these interests suggests that submerged passage of nuclear submarines
through straits should require notification and authorization. See Burke, supra note 7, at
212-14 (author's views). For other appraisals, see Knauss, The Military Role in the
Ocean and Its Relation to the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: A NEW GENEVA
CONFERENCE 77-86 (L. Alexander ed. 1972); Osgood, supra note 7, at 11-24.
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APPENDIX I
Revised Single Negotiating Text8l
Chapter II: Straits used for international navigation
SECTION 2. TRANSIT PASSAGE
Article 36
Scope of this section
This section applies to straits which are used for international navi-
gation between one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone and another area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
Article 37
Right of transit passage
1. In straits referred to in article 36, all ships and aircraft enjoy the
right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded, except that if the
strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its
mainland, transit passage shall not apply if a high seas route or a
route in an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with re-
spect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics exists sea-
ward of the island.
2. Transit passage is the exercise in accordance with this Chapter of
the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of con-
tinuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one area of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another area of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone. However, the requirement of con-
tinuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the
strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State
bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State.
3. Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit pas-
81. Revised Text, supra note 3, at 159-60. Significant changes from the Informal
Text are indicated in italics. See Informal Text, supra note 2, at 158-59.
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sage through a strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions
of the present Convention.
Article 38
Duties of ships and aircraft during their passage
1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage,
shall:
(a) Proceed without delay through or over the strait;
(b) Refrain from any threat or use of force against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States
bordering straits, or in any other manner in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations;
(c) Refrain from any activities other than those incident to their
normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless
rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress; [italics in
original]
(d) Comply with other relevant provisions of this Chapter.
2. Ships in transit shall:
(a) Comply with generally accepted international regulations,
procedures and practices for safety at sea, including the In-
ternational Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea;
(b) Comply with generally accepted international regulations,
procedures and practices for the prevention and control of
pollution from ships.
3. Aircraft in transit shall:
(a) Observe the Rules of the Air established by the International
Civil Aviation Organization as they apply to civil aircraft;
State aircraft will normally comply with such safety measures
and will at all times operate with due regard for the safety of
navigation;
(b) At all times monitor the radio frequency assigned by the ap-
propriate internationally designated air traffic control au-
thority or the appropriate international distress radio fre-
quency.
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Article 39
Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in
straits used for international navigation
1. In conformity with this Chapter, States bordering straits may
designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes for navi-
gation in straits where necessary to promote the safe passage of ships.
2. Such States may, when circumstances require, and after giving
due publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation
schemes for any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously des-
ignated or prescribed by them.
3. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to
generally accepted international regulations.
4. Before designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or
substituting traffic separation schemes, States bordering straits shall
refer proposals to the competent international organization with a
view to their adoption. The organization may adopt only such sea
lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be agreed with the States
bordering the straits, after which the States may designate, prescribe
or substitute them.
5. In respect of a strait where sea lanes or traffic separation
schemes are proposed through the waters of two or more States bor-
dering the strait, the States concerned shall co-operate in formulating
proposals in consultation with the organization.
6. States bordering straits shall clearly indicate all sea lanes and
traffic separation schemes designated or prescribed by them on charts
to which due publicity shall be given.
7. Ships in transit shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic sepa-
ration schemes established in accordance with this article.
Article 40
Laws and regulations of States bordering
straits relating to transit passage
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits
may make laws and regulations relating to transit passage through
straits, in respect of all or any of the following:
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(a) The safety of navigation and the regulation of marine traffic,
as provided in article 39;
(b) The prevention of pollution by giving effect to applicable in-
ternational regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily
wastes and other noxious substances in the strait;
(c) With respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, in-
cluding the stowage of fishing gear;
(d) The taking on board or putting overboard of any commodity,
currency or person in contravention of the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations of States bordering
straits.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or fact
amongst foreign ships, nor in their application have the practical ef-
fect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage as
defined in this section.
3. States bordering straits shall give due publicity to all such laws
and regulations.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of transit passage shall comply
with such laws and regulations.
5. The flag State of a ship or aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity
which acts in a manner contrary to such laws and regulations or other
provisions of this Chapter shall bear international responsibility for
any loss or damage which results to States bordering straits.
Article 41
Navigation and safety aids and other improvements
and the prevention and control of pollution
User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement co-
operate:
(a) In the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary
navigation and safety aids or other improvements in aid of in-
ternational navigation; and
(b) For the prevention and control of pollution from ships.
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Article 42
Duties of States bordering straits
States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage and shall
give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight
within or over the strait of which it has knowledge. There shall be no
suspension of transit passage.
SECTION 3. INNOCENT PASSAGE
Article 43
Innocent Passage
1. The r6gime of innocent passage, in accordance with section 3 of
Chapter I, shall apply in straits used for international navigation:
(a) Excluded under paragraph 1 of article 37, from the applica-
tion of the rdgime of transit passage; or
(b) Between one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State.
2. There shall be no suspension of innocent passage through such
straits.
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